Note 12 on its debt and credit facilities, for example. Your author adds the line under a few of the words:
As at December 31, 2021, the Company had utilized $206.5 million (December 31, 2020 – $7.5 million) of its $1,500.0 million revolving credit facility, of which $6.5 million was used for letters of credit. In 2021, the Company drew down $200.0 million on the revolving credit facility. Subsequent to December 31, 2021, the Company drew $1,100.0 million on the revolving credit facility.
Which means this…
…is now even more fragile. And for fun, here’s what Mark Shoot-The-Gray-Rhino Bristow said today about GBR: “It’s a piece of ground, a prospective piece of exploration ground with some bore holes in it,” Bristow said. “And the market put an eight-million-ounce resource on it. That would make it one of the biggest gold mines ever in Canada. But it’ll take you eight years to actually start building it.”
Yes yes yes we know balance sheets are boring, but when you’re Kinross and trying to get your high cost operations to pay for La Coipa capex, the acquisition of GBR does start to look like a stretch. One of the scenarios we floated at the time of the GBR deal was that underbidder Bristow might step back and let Special K blow its brains out on the deal, then move to scoop up both later. Perhaps that’s why K has loaded its balance sheet up with debt again, to make itself too unpalatable. Either way, there’s not much to love about K’s quarter.